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Attorneys for Appellees
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Gail Norris appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to
Defendants on her claims of wrongful discharge under New Jersey’s Conscientious
Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J.S.A. § 34:19-1, et seq., a whistleblowing statute.
Because we agree with the District Court that Pennsylvania law, not New Jersey law,
governs Norris’s claims, we will affirm.
Norris was hired by DiMark Marketing, Inc. in 1996, and reported daily to work at
DiM ark Marketing’s facility in Langhorne, Pennsylvania. In 2000, Harte-Hanks Direct,
Inc. (“Direct”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Harte-Hanks, Inc. incorporated
in Delaware, acquired DiMark Marketing. Following this acquisition, Norris continued to
be employed by Direct and continued to report daily to work at the Langhorne,
Pennsylvania facility. During the relevant time period, Direct did not own, operate or
maintain any facilities in New Jersey, nor did it employ anyone there.
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One of Norris’ primary responsibilities at Direct was to resolve any issues with
Direct’s subcontractors and to improve vendor relationships. One of the vendors with
whom Norris worked was Printing Management Systems, Inc. (“PMSI”), a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Harte-Hanks incorporated in Delaware. Norris became suspicious that
PMSI was not following Direct’s protocol and, perhaps, was falsifying bulk mailing
forms, and decided to investigate it herself at PMSI’s facility in Bellmawr, New Jersey.
Although Norris’s investigation did not reveal evidence that PMSI had falsified any bulk
mailing forms, she speculated that PMSI might in the future forge bulk mailing forms in
order to disguise its failure to meet mailing deadlines set by Direct. Norris disclosed her
concerns to her superiors at Direct.
In October 2001, subsequent to Norris’s disclosure of PMSI-related complaints to
her Direct superiors, Direct terminated Norris’s employment. The termination decision
was made by Direct personnel located in Pennsylvania; nothing in the record even
suggests that either PMSI or Harte-Hanks contributed to the decision to terminate, or that
any one or any entity located in New Jersey participated in, much less orchestrated or
directed, the termination decision.
Norris filed her complaint in this action in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
stating that Defendants 1 violated CEPA by terminating her employment “in retaliation for
1

Norris named as defendants Harte-Hanks, some of her superiors at Direct
involved in the decision to terminate her employment (Lori Andresen and Wayne
Rosenberger), and a senior vice president of Harte-Hanks at the time of the events at issue
(Charles Dall’Acqua). She did not name Direct as a defendant.
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her disclosure of, and her refusal to participate in,” the alleged misconduct at PMSI’s
Bellmawr, New Jersey facility. Defendants removed the suit to the District Court on
diversity grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) and, following discovery, moved for
summary judgment. The District Court granted Defendants’ motion, concluding that
(a) Pennsylvania law, not New Jersey law, governed Norris’s wrongful discharge claims
and that (b) Pennsylvania law provided her no redress.
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We apply plenary review to a district
court’s grant of summary judgment. See Morton Int’l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343
F.3d 669, 679 (3d Cir. 2003). “The district court’s application of ... choice-of-law rules
involves the application of legal principles and therefore is subject to plenary review.”
General Ceramics, Inc. v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Companies, 66 F.3d 647, 651 (3d Cir.
1995).
“A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice of law
rules of the forum state.” Echols v. Pelullo, 377 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941)). The District Court
was therefore bound to apply New Jersey’s choice of law rules in determining which law
would govern Norris’s claims. The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that New
Jersey’s choice-of-law “rule applies a flexible ‘governmental-interest’ standard, which
requires application of the law of the state with the greatest interest in resolving the
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particular issue that is raised in the underlying litigation.” Gantes v. Kason Corp., 679
A.2d 106, 109 (N.J. 1996) (citations omitted). This test has two prongs: (1) “an inquiry
into whether there is an actual conflict between the laws of the respective states, a
determination that is made on an issue-by-issue basis[,]” Gantes, 679 A.2d at 109
(citation omitted); and (2) “to determine the interest that each state has in resolving the
specific issue in dispute[, an] ... analysis [that] requires the court to ‘identify the
governmental policies underlying the law of each state and how those policies are
affected by each state’s contacts to the litigation and to the parties.’” Id. (citation
omitted). “If the state’s contacts are not related to the policies underlying its law, then
that state does not possess an interest in having its law apply.” Veazey v. Doremus, 510
A.2d 1187, 1189 (N.J. 1986) (citations omitted).
Norris argues that we should apply New Jersey’s CEPA because she reported to
work in New Jersey, was a New Jersey resident, and threatened to disclose alleged
misconduct that occurred in New Jersey. Norris’s primary contention on appeal is that
these facts, read through the lens of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in
D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 628 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1993), require application of
New Jersey law. But Norris misreads D’Agostino, and the record does not support the
existence of genuine issues as to material facts sufficient to require reversal.
In D’Agostino, plaintiff, a United States citizen and long-time resident of
Switzerland, alleged that he was wrongfully terminated by his Swiss employer, Cilag, a
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wholly-owned subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson (“J & J”), a New Jersey corporation.
D’Agostino alleged that he was terminated for failing to pay a bribe to a Swiss regulatory
official involved in the review of a drug that Cilag was attempting to register in
Switzerland. He brought a wrongful discharge claim against J & J, alleging that J & J had
masterminded the Swiss bribery scheme in New Jersey, and had itself ordered Cilag to
fire him in retaliation for his refusal to pay the bribe.
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that New Jersey law would govern the
dispute. The court noted the evidence of “J & J’s extensive oversight of Cilag[,]” 628
A.2d at 317, as well as J & J’s role in orchestrating the Swiss bribery scheme. It stated
that the case was “not about regulating just Swiss employment relationships[,]” but rather
about regulating the conduct of a parent company located in New Jersey, specifically, that
company’s engagement in an illegal bribery scheme through its subsidiary’s employees,
and its ordering the firing of any such employees who refused to cooperate in the scheme.
Id. at 316 (stating that “the thesis of plaintiff’s case is that J & J orchestrated in New
Jersey the bribing of a foreign official, allegedly in violation of the [federal Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act] and potentially subjecting a United States citizen to criminal
prosecution, and plaintiff’s subsequent dismissal for failing to pay the bribe.”). The court
concluded that because the bribery scheme was hatched, and the wrongful discharge
directed, by J & J from its New Jersey headquarters, New Jersey law should apply.
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Unlike the plaintiff in D’Agostino, Norris has failed to adduce evidence creating a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harte-Hanks or any other Defendant – like J
& J in D’Agostino – engineered the misconduct which Norris alleged took place at
PMSI’s Bellmawr, New Jersey facility, that any such engineering took place in New
Jersey, or that any of the Defendants made or influenced the decision to terminate her
employment in New Jersey. Nor does the record support Norris’s statements that she was
employed in New Jersey (in addition to Pennsylvania). And Norris’s New Jersey
residence does her little good – the record demonstrates that she was employed in
Pennsylvania, and “it is well-established in New Jersey that claims of a New Jersey
resident, relating to out-of-state employment, are governed by the law of the state in
which that New Jersey resident is employed.” Brunner v. Allied Signal, Inc., 198 F.R.D.
612, 614 (D.N.J. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, the District Court properly refused to apply New Jersey law, and
properly granted summary judgment to the Defendants. Therefore, we will affirm.
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